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INTRODUCTION

Twenty years ago, consumers could bring widespread attention to
their complaints only if newspapers or television stations reported their
problems. Now websites such as ConsumerAffairs.com provide angry
customers with a platform. ConsumerAffairs.com allows consumers to
post reviews about businesses, and it enables businesses to post
responses to those concerns. ConsumerAffairs.com deletes consumer
reviews at its discretion.' Many of the reviews have upset businesses,
including Nemet Chevrolet, a franchised automobile dealer that was the
subject of six reviews.2 Thomas of Oakland Gardens, NY, claimed the
company misstated the price it would pay for a trade-in car. 3 "As my
wife said they are not like you when you promised to protect life and
property as a firefighter your word was good and you fulfilled your
promise. I just wanted you to know how Nemet Motors treats
firefighters

. . . ,"

Thomas wrote.4 ConsumerAffairs.com refused to

remove those reviews.5 Nemet sued ConsumerAffairs.com for
defamation and tortious interference with business expectancy. 6 The
district court held that Nemet could not sue ConsumerAffairs.com over
the third-party postings because Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act immunizes a "provider or user of an interactive computer
service" from lawsuits over content "provided by another information
content provider," and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Nemet Chevrolet is typical of many claims that are dismissed under
Section 230, which Congress passed in 1996.8 Plaintiffs seek to hold
websites accountable for damaging content posted by third parties, and
courts typically deny these claims under Section 230.9 Many
commentators have argued that such opinions are reasons to limit or
repeal Section 230's immunity for websites.'o The critics argue that
Congress never contemplated such broad immunity for websites from
defamation and other torts." But this Article argues that such changes
1. ConsumerAffairs.com, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.consumeraffairs.
com/consumerism/faq.html (last visited on Jan. 3, 2010).
2. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (E.D. Va.
2008).
3. Id. Complaint at 9, at 544 (Case No. 1:08cv254 (GBL)).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 2009).
7. Id. at 253-54, 258.
8. Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: DefamationLiabilityfor ThirdParty Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 470, 473 (2004).
9. Id. at 470.
10. Id. at 473.
I1. See, e.g., id. at 493 ("The broad construction of 230 by the courts is not entirely
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are imprudent and inconsistent with Congress's intentions and First
Amendment principles. Section 230 has allowed the Internet to flourish
as an open medium in which all consumers-rather than just the
websites' employees-provide content.' 2 If websites were not immune
for third-party content, the Internet likely would not be as open as it is
today.
Part II of this Article reviews Congress's reasons for passing Section
230: to encourage the growth of the Internet by relieving intermediaries
from liability for the content posted by third parties while expressly
encouraging them to impose their own content controls. Although some
critics have attempted to argue that Section 230 applies only to a small
subset of publishers and not to common-law "distributors," I argue that
their interpretation is contrary to the statute's plain text and legislative
history and that distributors such as websites are included within the
broader category of "publisher" covered by Section 230.
Part III reviews First Amendment doctrine, including libel law and
the wire service defense, to demonstrate the similarities between the
reasons for First Amendment protections and the arguments in favor of
Section 230. Although current First Amendment doctrine does not
require the breadth of Section 230's immunity, Section 230 addresses
many First Amendment concerns that led courts to immunize
intermediaries in other contexts. Because Congress passed Section 230
in the Internet's infancy, most courts have not had the chance to
determine the scope of constitutional immunity that Internet providers
and websites should receive.
Part IV argues that as applied, Section 230 is not as overbroad or
unfair as many critics allege. This part first examines many recent
decisions in which courts have declined to extend Section 230 immunity
to intermediaries and demonstrates that the immunity is not as broad as
some critics might suggest. It then surveys the cases in which courts
have immunized intermediaries under Section 230 and concludes that
much of the speech would be protected even without Section 230. This
Article presents the increasingly used alternative to suing the
intermediary: using a court's subpoena power to sue the anonymous
consistent with the intent of Congress and has produced a number of troubling results.");
Jennifer Benedict, Deafening Silence: The Quest for a Remedy in Internet Defamation, 39
CumB. L. REv. 475, 509 (2009) ("Currently, the law allows a type of 'wild west' where anything
goes, and people are left alone to fend for themselves.").
12. The rapid growth of third-party content can be seen in the success of blogs and social
networking websites such as Facebook, which rely on content created by its users. In August
2009, 17% of U.S. Internet usage was consumed by social networks and blogs, three times the
percentage of time that was spent on such sites a year earlier. Press Release, Nielsen Co.,
Nielsen Reports 17 Percent of Time Spent on the Internet in August Devoted to Social
Networking and Blog Sites, Up from 6 Percent a Year Ago (Sept. 23, 2009) (on file with
author).
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poster. The Article finally reviews the practices and policies regarding
third-party comments of the largest social networking and news
websites, and it finds consumers' expectations for civility and standards
drives many of the websites to voluntarily remove objectionable
content. It is more consistent with First Amendment values to allow
intermediaries-rather than the courts--determine content standards.
Websites and Internet service providers have tailored their practices and
policies in response to consumer demand. This free-market approach to
free speech is well established in the First Amendment.
This Article does not trivialize the legitimate concerns about Section
230. With the vast amount of information available on the Internet, it is
easy for an anonymous comment to ruin an individual's reputation who
understandably wants to recover damages. But the fairest method of
recovery is to sue the person who posted the damaging content, not the
passive intermediary that played little or no role in the creation.
Rather than propose sweeping changes to Section 230 or alternative
interpretations of the statute, this Article argues that judicial
interpretations of Section 230 are correct as matters of statutory law and
policy. The general reasons for Section 230's broad immunity are
supported by constitutional decisions that limit liability for speech in
other contexts. Although Internet service providers and websites have
not faced significant tort liability, they have adopted many of the
content protection measures that Congress envisioned when it passed
the unprecedented statutory immunity.

II. CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE OF SECTION 230
Courts have broadly applied Section 230 to websites that are sued
over content posted by third parties.13 Some critics have argued that this
broad interpretation is inappropriate and contrary to Congress's
intentions when it passed Section 230.14 They argue that Congress never
imagined the statute would provide sweeping immunity to websites. For
example, one critic wrote that "[c]ourts have interpreted this immunity
provision so broadly as to provide virtually complete immunity for
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from defamation liability for third13. See infra Part IV.
14. See Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-mail and Employer Liability: Why Razing
Zeran v. America Online is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25, 9 (2000) (stating that
Congress intended Section 230 to "force ISPs to stop policing their servers in order to minimize
libel suits"); Carl S. Kaplan, How is Libel Diferent in Cyberspace?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2001
("Ian Ballon, a lawyer with Manatt, Phelps & Phillips in Palo Alto and editor of a cyberlaw
treatise, 'E-Commerce and Internet Law (Glasser LegalWorks, 2001),' said that he believed that
many courts, including Judge Richman's, have construed the scope of section 230 more broadly
than Congress intended.").
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party content, a result that the original co-sponsors of the bill probably
did not intend." 5 Critics also have argued that the common-law
distinction between "distributors" and "primary publishers" renders
Section 230's immunity inapplicable to websites.16 But a closer
examination of the reasons for Section 230 reveals that Congress
anticipated such broad immunity for intermediary Internet service
providers and websites.
A. Congress IntendedBroadImmunity With Section 230
First, it is important to examine whether the First Amendment places
restraints on the depth of the immunity that Congress may confer to
intermediaries. As Professor Rebecca Tushnet wrote:
My main concern is to show that Congress is free, within rather
broad limits, to determine an appropriate intermediary liability
regime. The First Amendment does not currently require a
particular solution. That being said, if individuals' speech should
not be attributed to intermediaries when it is unlawful, we should
at least consider ways in which intermediaries could be deterred
from interfering with it when it is lawful. The current regime
privileges access providers over both individual speakers and
third parties harmed by those speakers' speech. Sometimes that is
a mistake, and it is not one that the First Amendment bars us
from correcting.' 7
This Article argues that Section 230 is Congress's explicitly chosen
method of implementing First Amendment values. Section 230 balances
the First Amendment need to limit intermediary responsibility for third
party-content with the desire of Congress to encourage intermediaries to
impose their own content standards. It is helpful to look at Congress's
reasons for passing Section 230. A review of the caselaw leading to
Section 230's passage and statements by members of Congress
demonstrates that Congress intended for Section 230 to provide
websites and Internet service providers with broad immunity from tort
claims.
Common-law liability for republishers is articulated in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that "one who repeats or
otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he

15. Lee, supra note 8.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 986, 988 (2008).
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had originally published it."' 8 Courts recognized this common law
principle, with one court enunciating a "black-letter rule that one who
republishes a libel is subject to liability just as if he had published it
originally, even though he attributes the libelous statement to the
original publisher, and even though he expressly disavows the truth of
the statement."19 As explained in the next section, courts have imposed
constitutional constraints on this common-law rule by finding that the
First Amendment provides some protection to intermediaries that are
passive distributors. 20
Two early cases involving online intermediary liability laid the
foundation for Section 230's passage. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.2 1
was the earliest defamation case involving an online intermediary.
CompuServe provided bulletin boards and electronic information to
people who dialed to this service via their modem.2 2 Among
CompuServe's offerings was "Rumorville," a daily online newsletter
about the journalism industry, which was published by a CompuServe
contractor. 3 Plaintiffs sued both the contractor and CompuServe,
claiming they were defamed in the online newsletter. 24 The Court
granted summary judgment for CompuServe, finding an important
common-law distinction between publishers and distributors: "With
respect to entities such as news vendors, bookstores, and libraries,
however, New York courts have long held that vendors and distributors
of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither know nor have
reason to know of the defamation."25 Therefore, under Cubby, an
Internet service provider or website is not liable if it has not been
monitoring and editing third-party content and does not have a reason to
know that the content is defamatory.
Four years later, a New York state trial court applied that rule in a
decision that prompted the passage of Section 230. In Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,26 a company sued Prodigy,
another online service provider, over comments posted by a third party
about the company's stock. An anonymous poster alleged that the

18. Restatement (Second) Torts § 578 (1977). See infra Part II.B, for a discussion of the
distinction between common-law liability for primary publishers and secondary publishers, also
known as distributors.
19. Hoover v. Peerless Publ'ns, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
20. See infra Part III.
21. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
22. Id. at 137.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 138.
25. Id. at 139 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See infra Part ILA, for a
discussion of the First Amendment foundations for this limitation.
26. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1995).
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company was perpetrating a "major fraud." 27 The Court found that
Prodigy, unlike CompuServe in Cubby, was a publisher because
Prodigy enforced content guidelines by monitoring postings and using
software to screen offensive postings:
By actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete notes
from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness
and "bad taste", for example, PRODIGY is clearly making
decisions as to content ... and such decisions constitute editorial
control. . . . That such control is not complete and is enforced

both as early as the notes arrive and as late as a complaint is
made, does not minimize or eviscerate the simple fact that
PRODIGY has uniquely arrogated to itself the role of
determining what is proper for its members to post and read on its
bulletin boards.2 8
Therefore, under Stratton Oakmont, an intermediary could avoid tort
liability for third-party content by refusing to impose any content
controls. But if an intermediary began to exercise a slight amount of
control over the content, it risked losing immunity.
Members of Congress reacted to that disparity. Stratton Oakmont
was issued in 1995, just as many consumers began using the Internet as
a household staple. Many groups were concerned about indecency on
the Internet and argued that Stratton Oakmont would encourage
indecent content on the Internet, because websites and service providers
had an incentive to avoid monitoring. Stratton Oakmont provided
ammunition to members of Congress who were seeking to pass a bill
that immunizes ISPs and websites. They framed the court's decision as
one that penalizes online service providers for screening offensive
content. 29 Online service providers such as Prodigy teamed with
grassroots groups such as the Center for Democracy and Technology
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation to lobby Congress for
immunity.3 o
The provision's text is fairly simple, and it contains two main rules:
Section 230(c)(1) confers general immunity to Internet service
providers and websites by preventing them from being treated as
publishers of content created by third parties,3 and Section 230(c)(2)
27. Id. at*1.
28. Id. at *4.
29. Mary Jane Fine, Mom Wants AOL to Pay in Child's Sex Ordeal, She Calls Service
Liable, Despite Law, BERGEN REC., Apr. 19, 1998.
30. Press Release, Prodigy Services Company, Supported by its Competitors and in
Congress, Prodigy Presses its Case in Online Libel Suit (July 26, 1995) (on file with author).
31. "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the

130

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW &POLICY

[Vol. 15

guarantees that the immunity is not abrogated by the online
intermediary's effort's to screen out objectionable content.32 This
immunity does not extend to alleged intellectual property violations or
alleged federal criminal violations. 3
In the conference report for the Communications Decency Act, the
conferees mentioned Stratton Oakmont as an impetus for the bill:
One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton
Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of
content that is not their own because they have restricted access
to objectionable material. The conferees believe that such
decisions create serious obstacles to the important federal policy
of empowering parents to determine the content of
communications their children receive through interactive
computer services.3 4
But Congress wanted more than a repeal of Stratton Oakmont. It
wanted to spur unfettered growth of the Internet. The conference report
stated that Stratton Oakmont was one of the reasons for Section 230, but
it was not the only reason. 35 Congressman Bob Goodlatte, one of the
bill's co-sponsors, described the need for the emerging Internet industry
to have few constraints:

publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998). Section 230 defines "interactive computer service" as "any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Courts have widely held that websites and
Internet service providers are considered interactive computer services for the purposes of
Section 230. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2008); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (1998).
32.
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable
on account of--(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (1998).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (1998).
34. H.R. REP. No.104-458, at 174 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
35. Id.
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There is no way that any of those entities, like Prodigy, can take
the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be
coming in to them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin
board. We are talking about something that is far larger than our
daily newspaper. We are talking about something that is going to
be thousands of pages of information every day, and to have that
imposition imposed on them is wrong.3 6
Critics of Section 230's broad immunity, such as Professor Daniel J.
Solove, argue that Congress's true intent was not to provide absolute
tort immunity, but to encourage content monitoring and that websites
lose immunity once they receive notice of the allegedly tortious
content. 37 But the text of Section 230 indicates that the congressional
purpose was in fact broader. Congress was concerned with any
government actors-including the judicial system-burdening the
growth of the Internet. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the plain text of
Section 230(c)(1) "is general," and although Congress passed the statute
partly in response to Stratton Oakmont, "a law's scope often differs
from its genesis. Once the legislative process 3gets rolling, interest
groups seek (and often obtain) other provisions." Had Congress only
passed Section 230(c)(2), critics of the statute's broad application would
be correct: the immunity would only apply to websites' attempts to edit
and screen objectionable content. But Congress did not only pass
Section 230(c)(2); it also included Section 230(c)(1). Therefore, the
immunity conferred by the plain text is far broader.
Congress could have written Section 230 as an incentive: if websites
screened content, they would receive immunity. But Congress did not
do this, and moreover, such a system would be impracticable. It would
be difficult for courts or Congress to determine the extent of content
screening necessary for a website to be immune. Such a rule likely
would lead to over-screening: websites would delete even
unobjectionable content in an effort to ensure that they still received
36. 141 CONG. REc. H8471 (1995).
37. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY

ON THE INTERNET 154 (2007).

Section 230 might be read to grant immunity only before the operator of a
website is alerted that something posted there by another violates somebody's
privacy or defames her. If the operator of a website becomes aware of the
problematic material on the site, yet doesn't remove it, then the operator could
be liable.
Id.
38. Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).
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immunity. Congress instead gave the websites immunity for content that
they have edited, but Congress did not require the editing in order to
receive immunity.
Similarly, Congress could have passed a law requiring content
screening, although that might have met separate First Amendment
challenges similar to the anti-indecency provisions of the
Communications Decency Act struck down in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union.3 9 Rather than penalize online service providers for
failing to screen content, Congress provided them with broad tort
immunity that applied regardless of whether they screen content. In his
floor statement during debate on the bill, Representative Christopher
Cox, the bill's sponsor, acknowledged that Congress could have
imposed more regulations rather than confer immunity. 40 But adding
regulations as technology is emerging, Representative Cox noted, would
be unwise:
The message today should be from this Congress we embrace this
new technology, we welcome the opportunity for education and
political discourse that it offers for all of us. We want to help it
along this time by saying Government is going to get out of the
way and let parents and individuals control it rather than
Government doing that job for us.41
B. Congress Intended to Cover All Types ofPublishers,
Including Distributors
The common law recognizes different types of publishers, includinA
primary publishers and secondary publishers, known as distributors.
Under defamation common law, publishers were held to different
liability standards depending on their classification.4 3 Primary
publishers, who played a role in the creation of the content, were strictly
liable for defamation, regardless of whether they know of the falsity,
subject to the First Amendment's requirements for actual malice in the
case of public officials and public figures that emerged in 1964.44 The
39. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
40. 141 CONG REC. H8460 (1995) [hereinafter Statement of Congressman Cox]
4 1. Id.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581, cmt. C (1977); W. Page Keeton,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (5th ed. 1984). Critics of Section 230 tend to

use the term "distributors," because this distinguishes them from primary publishers. Defenders
of the immunity refer to websites and ISPs as "secondary publishers." But the terms are
interchangeable. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 565 F.3d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Secondary
publishers came to be known as distributors.").
43. Barnes, 564 F. 3d at 562.
44. See infra Part III.C, for a discussion of this constitutional limitation and how it relates
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Stratton Oakmont court applied primary publisher liability to Prodigy
because of its role in screening the content.4 5 Secondary publishers, or
distributors, are only liable for defamatory content if they know of the
defamation. 46 This was the case in Cubby.47 Critics of Section 230's
broad application argue that Congress only intended the immunity to
apply to primary publishers and not to secondary publishers. 4 8 Although
this argument has merit, it does not comply with the bill's legislative
history and text.
Courts generally have held that distributors such as ISPs and
websites are among the "publishers" covered by the text of Section 230.
A commonly cited opinion for this proposition is Zeran v. America
Online,4 9 which the Fourth Circuit issued a year after Section 230's
passage. The plaintiff in Zeran sued America Online over allegedly
defamatory postings created by an America Online customer.5 The
plaintiff claimed that America Online was liable because it failed to
promptly remove the postings after the plaintiff complained.51 The
district court granted America Online's motion to dismiss based on
Section 230,52 and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that Congress did not
intend to cover distributors such as America Online in Section 230."
The plaintiff argued that distributors are liable once they have notice
that they are distributing the defamatory material, and because he
provided that notice to America Online, the company was liable for
damages. 54 Congress, the plaintiff argued, only intended to immunize
Internet service providers in their role as primary publishers, as defined
by common law.55 The Fourth Circuit refused to narrowly construe
Section 230's immunity. Noting that under defamation common law,
"every repetition of a defamatory statement is considered a
publication," the Court said that both primary publishers and
distributors are considered publishers for the purposes of Section 230.56

to Section 230 immunity.
45. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995).
46. See infra Part III.A, for a discussion of the First Amendment reasons for this
limitation on distributor liability.
47. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
48. See supra note 8.
49. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
50. Id. at 328.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 330.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 331.
55. Id. at 331-32.
56. Id. at 332.
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Distributor liability the Court found, is a "subset, or a species, of
publisher liability." ?7
Although its definition of "publisher" has been widely adopted by
state and federal courts, Zeran received criticism from academics. 5
Opponents of extending Section 230 broadly argued that Congress
intended to immunize online "publishers" that edit content, indicated in
Stratton Oakmont, and not passive "distributors," as per the case of
Cubby.59 But the bill's sponsors implied they intended to immunize both
distributors such as CompuServe as well as an online service provider
such as Prodigy, which took a more active role in content editing.60
Representative Cox, one of Section 230's primary sponsors, said he
wanted to "encourage people like ... CompuServe. . . [by] . .. [T] ...

[I] protect[ing] them from taking on liability such as occurred in the
[Stratton Oakmont] case in New York that they should not face for
helping us . .. solve this problem." 6 1 The California Supreme Court, in
reversing one of the few opinions that refused to apply Section 230 to
distributors, held that the text of Section 230, combined with such
legislative history, demonstrates that "Congress implemented its intent
not by maintaining the common law distinction between 'publishers'
and 'distributors,' but by broadly shielding all providers from liability
for 'publishing' information received from third parties." 62
By passing Section 230, Congress recognized the free-speech value
in allowing intermediaries to determine content standards and not
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The
Case of Intermediary Liabilityfor Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 640 (2001) ("The
court ignored the argument that when a distributor has notice of defamation, its refusal to cease
distribution justifies according it the same level of responsibility as a primary publisher.");
David Wiener, Comment: Negligent Publication of Statements Posted on Electronic Bulletin
Boards: Is There Any Liability Left After Zeran?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 905, 929-30 (1999).
Although Congress wished to "preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet," the statute should not necessarily protect
system operators from all torts related to the publication of third party
statements. Immunizing a system operator who knowingly and willfully
transmits inaccurate content on an electronic bulletin board does not promote
the "vibrant speech" policy behind the CDA.
Id; David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REv. 147, 168 (1997)
(arguing that "both the text of the CDA and its meager legislative history support the conclusion
that when Congress said 'publisher,' it meant 'publisher,' and not 'distributor.')
59. See 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 905 at 929.
60. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 522 (Cal. 2006) (quoting 141 CONG. REc. H8470
(Aug. 4, 1995)).
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
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holding them responsible for content created by third parties. As the
Fourth Circuit explained in Zeran, "The amount of information
communicated via interactive computer services is therefore staggering.
The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would
have an obvious chilling effect." 63 Therefore, Congress sought to allow
websites to screen third-party content based on their own standards
without worrying whether those standards were sufficient to protect
them from defamation lawsuits.
Six years after the passage of the Communications Decency Act, the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, where the bill originated,
endorsed the interpretation in Zeran:
The Committee notes that ISPs have successfully defended many
lawsuits using section 230(c). The courts have correctly
interpreted section 230(c), which was aimed at protecting against
liability for such claims as negligence (See, e.g., Doe v. America
Online, 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001)) and defamation (Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, and Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980 (2000);
Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (1997)).6
Although such a congressional statement is not binding, it
demonstrates that less than a decade after Section 230's enactment, the
committee who wrote the bill endorsed the interpretation in Zeran.
From Section 230's legislative history, Congress wanted to promote
robust growth of the Internet. Had Congress wanted to immunize
websites and ISPs that do not qualify as distributors under the common
law, Section 230 would have had little impact. It would allow courts to
impose liability on a website that had knowledge of defamatory content
but took no action to remove it.
Granted, Congress would have been able to eliminate these
objections by stating that "publishers" in Section 230 means both
primary publishers and secondary publishers, but such a distinction was
unnecessary, as the Fourth Circuit demonstrated in Zeran.6 5 In short, the
critics who argue that distributors are not covered by Section 230
misinterpret Congress's actions as well as the definition of "publisher."
Although the common law established multiple categories of
"publisher," there is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress
only intended to cover one type of publisher.

63. Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
64. H.R. REP. No. 107-449, at 13 (2002).
65. 129 F.3d at 332.
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT FOUNDATIONS OF SECTION 230

Other critics concede that the courts have correctly interpreted the
statute, but they argue that Congress should narrow its scope. For
example, John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have argued that Congress should
amend Section 230 to allow negligence claims against ISPs and
websites when plaintiffs' safety has been threatened.6 6 Jennifer Benedict
has proposed that Congress amend Section 230 to create a "notice-andtakedown" system similar to that under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act: a potential plaintiff would first be required to notify a
website about harmful content posted by a third party, and the website
would be immune from liability only if it removed the content. 67
Section 230's critics minimize the importance of First Amendment
cases that have immunized intermediaries for decades. Because the
Internet did not emerge as a common technology until the 1990s, these
cases involved offline intermediaries, but the general principles are
similar. Although Section 230's immunity extends beyond intermediary
protections provided by the First Amendment, the reasoning behind
Section 230 is supported in many First Amendment decisions from the
past century. In particular, courts have found that the First Amendment
limits liability for distributors of content and news organizations that
publish allegedly defamatory articles about public officials and
figures. Courts also have adopted a First Amendment-based privilege
for news organizations that retransmit stories written by wire services.
A. Smith v. California and Distributor Liability
Under Zeran and its progeny, ISPs and websites that display thirdparty comments typically are considered distributors, which is a
"subset" of publishers under Section 230. To argue that most of the ISPs
and websites are primary publishers of third-party content would be a
stretch, considering the vast amount of e-mail, blog postings, and other
third-party content on the Internet. Therefore, any constitutional
protections for distributors also should apply to most websites and ISPs.
Although distributors' First Amendment protections are not as farreaching as Section 230, the reasons for their more limited immunity are
66. JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 106 (2008).

67.
68.
388 U.S.
69.
1492 (D.
1986).

THE FIRST

Benedict, supra note 11, at 475.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts,
130 (1964).
See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487,
Ariz. 1996); Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476-77 (S.D. Fla.
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analogous to Congress's reasons for passing Section 230.
The roots of distributor First Amendment protection are in Smith v.
California,7 0 a 1959 Supreme Court decision. In Smith, a bookstore
owner was convicted under a city ordinance that made it illegal "for any
person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent writing, [or]
book ... in any place of business where . .. books ... are sold or kept
for sale." 1 The bookstore owner challenged the ordinance as a violation
of his First Amendment rights.72 The Supreme Court agreed with the
bookstore owner and invalidated the city ordinance, finding that it was
unconstitutional to hold the distributor of obscene material strictly liable
By
if the distributor did not know the material was obscene.
eliminating any requirement of scienter for liability, the Court found,
the cit ordinance was unduly burdensome on free speech and the
press.7 The Court held that "this ordinance's strict liability feature
would tend seriously to have that effect, by penalizing booksellers, even
though they had not the slightest notice of the character of the books
they sold."7 5 The Court's concern with the ordinance is similar to
Congress's reasons for limiting website liability with Section 230:76 the
Court was concerned that excessive regulation would cause the
distributor to over-censor the material that it distributes:
By dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents
of the book on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to
impose a severe limitation on the public's access to
constitutionally protected matter. For if the bookseller is
criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, and the
ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict the books he
sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have
imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally
protected as well as obscene literature.7 7
The liability limitation articulated in Smith is not as broad as Section
230. Smith only protects distributors who lack any knowledge of the
content. Applying Smith's First Amendment framework to an Internet
defamation dispute, a website could be liable if a defamation plaintiff
asked the website to remove a third party's defamatory comments and
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

361 U.S. 147 (1959).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 152.
See Statement of Congressman Cox, supra note 40.
361 U.S. at 152-53.
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the website refused. Therefore, Smith does not require all of Section
230's immunity. But the reasoning behind Smith can easily apply to
Section 230, and arguably that Smith should be seen as a floor for
intermediary immunity rather than a ceiling. By passing Section 230,
Congress recognized that even with a scienter requirement, intermediary
liability would be an excessive burden on free speech. Therefore,
Congress chose to extend Smith's immunity regardless of scienter. The
Court in Smith was concerned that strict liability would cause
bookstores to over-censor in an effort to escape liability, and it
determined that in the case of bookstores, a scienter requirement was
adequate to prevent such over-censoring. 78 Compared to the vast
amount of third-party content on many websites, however, the
bookstore in Smith was responsible for a relatively small amount of
information. The Smith Court might not have found scienter to be a
reasonable protection for free speech on the Internet.
This argument is bolstered by Justice Black's concurrence in Smith.
Although Justice Black agreed with the majority's finding that the
ordinance was unconstitutional, he did not think that the holding
provided sufficient protection for distributors' First Amendment rights.
Justice Black wrote that the Court should have adopted a rule against
any distributor liability for illegal content, regardless of whether the
distributor knew of the obscenity: "The fact is, of course, that prison
sentences for possession of 'obscene' books will seriously burden
freedom of the press whether punishment is imposed with or without
knowledge of the obscenity." 79
Because prosecutors could easily demonstrate that bookstores knew
about books' contents, Justice Black wrote, "the way is left open for
state censorship and punishment of all other booksellers by merely
adding a few new words to old censorship laws. Our constitutional
safeguards for speech and press therefore gain little. Their victory, if
any, is a Pyrrhic one."80 Had Justice Black written the majority's
opinion in Smith, Section 230's absolute immunity for distributors
might have been constitutional doctrine.
Moreover, it is important to note that when the majority articulated
the rule for distributor liability in Smith, it was imposing a duty on
distributors that had a relatively finite amount of content; Smith
involved the inventory of a bookstore. Thus, it might have been more
practical to expect distributors to remove objectionable content upon
their discovery of the issue. A half century later, with seemingly infinite
data streaming across the Internet, it is more burdensome to expect a
78. Id.
79. Id. at 155-56 (Black, J. concurring).
80. Id. at 156.
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distributor or website to thoroughly investigate every complaint and
take proper action. The over-censoring that concerned the Court-and
particularly Justice Black-would be amplified in the Internet age with
Smith's scienter requirement as the sole protection.
Smith v. Californiashould be viewed not as a constitutional rejection
of Section 230, but as a minimum level of intermediary immunity that
stems from the same concerns that prompted Section 230. Courts have
applied the opinion's constitutional doctrine to immunize intermediaries
in a variety of contexts. For example, in Misut v. Mooney,8 1 a New York
trial court dismissed a lawsuit against a contract printer involving
editorials in a weekly newspaper that it printed. Although the printer
reviewed the publications for "nudity, profanity and vulgarity" 82 before
publishing, it "had no other input into the material which it printed. It
did not undertake to confirm facts or to check sources. It did not
exercise editorial judgment nor did it seek to determine the truth of the
material which it printed."8 Therefore, the Court concluded, the printer
could not be found at fault for any defamatory material that it printed.84
Courts have extended the logic of Smith v. California's limited
immunity for distributors of content beyond simply bookstores and
physical distributors." In Auvil v. CBS,8 6 the plaintiffs sued three CBS
affiliates over an allegedly defamatory broadcast on "60 Minutes."87
Although the affiliates would have been able to preempt the
programming, the Court granted a motion to dismiss because fault is
required to impose liability on an intermediary.8 8 After citing cases
immunizing bookstores based on Smith v. California, the Court stated
that "there is no logical basis for imposing a duty of censorship on the
visual media which does not likewise attach to the print chain of
distribution."8 9
B. Wire Service Defense
Courts have extended the reasoning of Smith v. California to the
wire service defense, which is even more similar, though far from
identical, to Section 230. In these cases, courts have immunized
newspapers for allegedly defamatory articles that they have published if
the articles were written by the Associated Press or other wire
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

475 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id.
800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
Id. at 931.
Id.
Id. at 932.
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services. 90 Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the wire
service defense, it has been widely adopted by state and federal courts.9 1
The earliest wire service defense case was Layne v. Tribune Co. 92 in
1933. The plaintiff sued a newspaper that published two wire service
reports about his alleged involvement in a criminal case. 93 The Court
ruled that liability for a wire service article is prohibited by the common
law:
The mere reiteration in a daily newspaper, of an actually false,
but apparently authentic news dispatch, received by a newspaper
publisher from a generally recognized reliable source of daily
news, such as some reputable news service agency engaged in
collecting and reporting the news, cannot through publication
alone be deemed per se to amount to an actionable libel by
indorsement, in the absence of some showing from the nature of
the article published, or otherwise, that the publisher must have
acted in a negligent, reckless, or careless manner in reproducing
it to another's injury. This is in harmony with the theory that
under the ancient rules of the common law, one who heard a
slander was not liable for repeating it, if he did so in the same
words, and at the same time gave in publishing it, his authority
for the statement made. 94

90. See, e.g., Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1174, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 220-21, 225 (E.D. Ky. 1990), aff'd, 931
F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1991); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp.
1487, 1491-92 (D. Ariz. 1996); Winn v. Associated Press, 903 F. Supp. 575, 579-80 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); Holden v. Clary, No. 92-313, 1992 WL 373145, at *1, *4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17,
1992); Winn v. United Press Int'l, 938 F. Supp. 39, 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1996), af'd, No. 96-72 17,
1997 WL 404959 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 1997); Brown v. Courier Herald Publ'g Co., 700 F. Supp.
534, 537-538 (S.D. Ga. 1988); Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476-77
(S.D. Fla. 1987); Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12, 16-17 (D. Alaska 1979); Kendrick v. Fox
Television, 659 A.2d 814, 824 (D.C. 1995); McKinney v. Avery Journal, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 295,
297 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Van Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447 N.W.2d
105, 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); Rust Commc'ns Group, Inc. v. 70 State St. Travel Serv. Ltd.,
122 A.D.2d 584 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Zetes v. Richman, 86 A.D.2d 746, 747 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982); MacGregor v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 119 So. 2d 85, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
91. See, e.g., Waskow, 462 F.2d at 1173; O'Brien, 735 F. Supp. at 218; Med. Lab. Mgmt.
Consultants, 931 F. Supp. at 1487; Winn, 903 F. Supp. at 575; Holden, 1992 WL at
373145; Winn, 938 F. Supp. at 39; Brown, 700 F. Supp. at 534; Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at
1468; Gay, 486 F. Supp. at 12; Kendrick, 659 A.2d at 814; McKinney, 393 S.E.2d at 295; Van
Straten, 447 N.W.2d at 105; Rust Commc'ns Group, Inc., 122 A.D.2d at 584; Zetes, 86 A.D.2d
at 746; MacGregor, 119 So. 2d at 85.
92. 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933).
93. Id. at 235.
94. Id. at 238.
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Courts also base the wire service defense on the First Amendment.
For example, in Waskow v. Associated Press, the plaintiff sued the
Washington Evening Star newspaper over an Associated Press article it
published, claiming that the plaintiff was sentenced to jail and fined due
to protests of the draft law.9 5 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the defamation lawsuit, holding that "[n]ewspaper
editors have no cause to doubt the accuracy of a major wire service
dispatch, absent an apparent inconsistency or other indication of
error." 96 Another court held that the defense "is consistent with modem
First Amendment jurisprudence," because in a defamation lawsuit
brought by a private party "involving a matter of public concern,
liability can only be imposed if the plaintiff can establish falsity and
intentional or reckless disregard for the truth . . . This approach is

consistent with the rule that there can be no 'conduit liability' in the
absence of fault." 97
Section 230's similarity to the wire service defense is apparent in
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. America Online, Inc., in which a
publicly traded company sued America Online for allegedly publishing
inaccurate stock price information. America Online displayed stock
prices as it received them from a stock quote provider. America
Online occasionally informed the stock price provider when it learned
of inaccurate information and it determined how to present the data to
subscribers, but America Online played no further role in the content
development. 00 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the claim, holding that under Section 230, the stock price provider,
not America Online, would be liable for any damages.' 0 ' America
Online's arrangement with the stock price provider is similar to that of a
newspaper's relationship with a wire service. Just as newspapers choose
the wire services they subscribe to and the stories they will publish,
America Online chose the stock price provider and which stocks it
would display to subscribers. The result in Ben Ezra is similar to the
result that many courts would reach by applying the wire service
defense.10 2 Although news organizations select and place wire service
stories, their role does not go far beyond that. They typically do not
95. 462 F.2d 1173, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
96. Id. at 1175-76.
97. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D.
Ariz. 1996).
98. 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2000).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 985
101. Id. at986.
102. See also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting
Section 230 immunity to America Online in a defamation lawsuit involving the Drudge Report,
which America Online contracted to provide to its subscribers).
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make significant changes to the stories' content, and they generally do
not verify the facts provided by a reputable wire service. The
newspapers are largely intermediaries for the wire services, and the
courts have found that such intermediaries should be protected from
liability under the First Amendment. This is similar to Section 230
cases, in which websites do not play a role in the creation of the thirdparty content. The websites may create topic-specific forums, for
example, that might play a role in the third party's decision to create the
content, but that alone is insufficient to remove Section 230 liability.
The wire service defense is narrower than Section 230's immunity in
an important respect. The wire service defense only applies when a
news organization publishes content that was provided by a reputable
wire service such as the Associated Press. Section 230 applies
regardless of the third party that created the content. Therefore, content
protected by the wire service defense is more likely to come from a
source that attempted to verify its accuracy. Although Section 230 is
similar to the wire service defense, it is not identical. But the principles
behind the wire service defense are similar to Section 230. The wire
service defense and Section 230 both recognize that intermediary
liability would burden free speech.
C. Actual Malice Requirement
Because most Section 230 claims involve defamation, it is helpful to
look at New York Times v. Sullivan,103 which recognized First
Amendment protection in some defamation claims. The Court held that
public officials must demonstrate that defendants in defamation lawsuits
acted with actual malice, finding that "[a] rule compelling the critic of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and
to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads
to a comparable 'self-censorship."' 104 In Sullivan, a government official
sued a newspaper over claims made in an advertisement.os After
finding that the public official was required to demonstrate actual
malice, the Court found that actual malice was not present in this
case. o0 Part of its reasoning centered on the fact that the newspaper
acted as an intermediary for the advertiser:
Finally, there is evidence that the Times published the
advertisement without checking its accuracy against the news
stories in the Times' own files. The mere presence of the stories
103.
104.
105.
106.

376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964).
Id. at 279.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 279-80, 285-86.
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in the files does not, of course, establish that the Times "knew"
the advertisement was false, since the state of mind required for
actual malice would have to be brought home to the persons in
the Times' organization having responsibility for the publication
of the advertisement. 0 7
The New York Times, in publishing an advertisement, was more like
an intermediary than a content creator, because it did not have
substantial input into the advertisement's content. 08 The Court
broadened this protection three years later, ruling that Sullivan's actual
malice requirement applies to "libel actions instituted by persons who
are not public officials, but who are 'public figures' and involved in
issues in which the public has a justified and important interest."' 09
An examination of Section 230's intersection with defamation law
would not be complete without a discussion of Ripoff Report. Ripoff
Report is a website that allows consumers to post reviews of
businesses.11o Most of the reviews are overwhelmingly negative and
accuse the businesses of perpetrating scams."'
The website's motto is "Don't let them get away with it ... let the
truth be known!"ll 2 Ripoff Report has a strict policy: it will never
remove a third-party post although it allows the businesses to post
rebuttals below the review.1 13 Of course, many businesses have not been
happy with this policy and sued Ripoff Report, seeking damages and the
removal of the original posts.114
Some businesses have accused Ripoff Report of extortion,'s a claim
that ironically led Ripoff Report to sue the newspaper that published
those claims. 16 But businesses largely have not succeeded in their legal
claims against Ripoff Report's parent company. Courts have granted

107. Id. at 287.
108. See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 1005 ("Sullivan was a case about the Times as
intermediary, displaying another entity's supposedly defamatory ad after only minimal
screening.").
109. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967).
110. Ed Magedson, Ripoff Editorial (Sept. 1, 1999), http://www.ripoffreport.com/
consumerssaythankyou/aboutus.aspx.
111. Latest Reports, http://www.ripoffreport.com/search/recent/3months.aspx (last visited
Oct. 7, 2010).
112. Ripoff Report, http://www.ripoffreport.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
113. About Us: Want to Sue Ripoff Report?, http://www.ripoffreport.com/ConsumersSay
ThankYou/WantToSueRipoftReport.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
114. Id.
115. Sarah Fenske, The Real Rip-OffReport, PHoNEIX NEw TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, available
at http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2007-02-01/new/the-real-rip-off-report.
116. Eric Goldman, Ripoff Report Folks Sue NewspaperandReporterfor Defamation,Apr.
30, 2008, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/ripoff report f.htm.
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Section 230 immunity to Ripoff Report in more than 20 cases.' 17
Ripoff Report's absolute prohibition on removal of comments may
seem harsh, but it recognizes the First Amendment value in debate:
rather than stifle speech that is allegedly inaccurate, this system allows
the inaccuracies to be fought by more speech. The Supreme Court in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc."'8 found that private figures, unlike public
figures and officials, were not required to demonstrate actual malice in
defamation claims partly because the private figures did not have access
to "self help," which it defined as "using available opportunities to
contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse
impact on reputation."' 19 The Ripoff Report, like most websites that
accept third-party content, provides potential plaintiffs with precisely
this form of self help.
Like Smith, Sullivan does not require the breadth of Section 230's
immunity, but it is another example of the Court's recognition that
expansive liability for content could lead to a reduction in speech.
Sullivan demonstrates the Court's willingness to limit liability that
could harm free speech.
The constitutional doctrines outlined in this section demonstrate the
wide range of First Amendment protections that courts provide to
intermediaries, particularly in defamation actions. Because Congress
passed Section 230 at the cusp of the Internet's growth, courts never had
the opportunity to develop similar First Amendment protections for
website intermediaries that do not play a role in the development of the
third-party content. Although it is impossible to know the precise
boundaries of the constitutional doctrine that would have evolved had
Congress never passed Section 230, it is clear that some level of First
Amendment immunity would have emerged.
IV. SECTION 230 BALANCES FREE SPEECH AND
FAIRNESS TO PLAINTIFFS

Although Section 230 has drawn criticism for the breadth of the
immunity that it provides, a review of recent cases finds that courts have
defined reasonable limits that conform to preexisting First Amendment
117. About Us, supra note 113 ("Based on the protection extended by the CDA, Ripoff
Report has successfully defended more than 20 lawsuits in both state and federal courts. Each
time, the courts have consistently found that the CDA shields Ripoff Report from any claims
seeking to treat it as the speaker or publisher of information posted by a third party."). See, e.g.,
Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Ariz. 2008); GW
Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 3:07-CV-976-O, 2009 WL 62173 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9,
2009).
118. 418U.S.323(1974).

119. Id. at 344.

DEFENDING SECTION 230: THE VALUE OFINTERMEDIARYIMMUNITY

2010]

145

doctrine. In many cases where courts immunize websites under Section
230, the websites would have otherwise been immune because the
plaintiff was a public figure or the plaintiff failed to state a claim.
Courts have declined to extend Section 230 immunity to cases in which
the defendant actively participated in the allegedly harmful conduct.
Finally, even when Section 230 immunizes intermediary websites for
allegedly harmful content, the defendant remains free to sue the third
party that created the content. Although plaintiffs face a technical
challenge of identifying the third party, U.S. courts have upheld
subpoenas for identifying information when the plaintiff states a valid
claim.
A. Courts Refuse to GrantImmunity to Websites that Participatein
Allegedly HarmfulActs
Courts have found reasonable limits to Section 230. Courts will not
grant immunity to websites that played a significant role in the creation
of allegedly harmful content, although it sometimes is difficult to define
the exact level of participation required to abrogate Section 230
immunity.
In FairHousing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC,12 0 the Ninth Circuit refused to grant Section 230 immunity to a
housing website that required consumers to answer questions about their
sex, sexual orientation, and whether they have children. 121 The plaintiff
alleged that this violated federal and California housing discrimination
laws.122 Noting that Section 230 "was not meant to create a lawless noman's-land on the Internet,"l 23 the Court denied the website's request to
extend Section 230 to these activities.124 "[T]he fact that users are
information content providers does not preclude [the website] from also
being an information content provider by helping develop at least in part
the information in the profiles." 25 Roommates.com is significant
because it demonstrates that websites still can be held accountable for
their own actions, just not the actions of third parties. Roommates.com
means that to lose immunity, the website must take specific steps to
encourage the illegal actions. In contrast, a civil rights group in Chicago
filed a similar federal housing law complaint against Craigslist for
allowing discriminatory housing advertisements.126 In Chicago
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1165.
Id.
Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
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Lawyers' Committeefor Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,Inc.,
the Seventh Circuit allowed Craigslist to receive Section 230 immunity
because unlike Roommates.com, Craigslist did not present any
questions or options that specifically encouraged the allegedly
discriminatory advertisements.
Although Roommates.com presents a unique fact pattern, its
limitation on immunity is present in other appellate and district court
opinions. For example, in Doe v. SexSearch.com,128 the plaintiff used an
online dating service to meet a person who said she was eighteen years
old. They had sexual relations, and the plaintiff was arrested because the
female was actually fourteen years old. 129 The plaintiff sued the
website, alleging that the site caused him to be arrested. 130 The district
court dismissed the lawsuit under Section 230.131 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim, but it declined
to dismiss based on Section 230: "We do not adopt the district court's
discussion of the Act, which would read § 230 more broadly than any
previous Court of Appeals decision has read it, potentially abrogating
all state- or common-law causes of action brought against interactive
Internet services."l32 Therefore, under Section 230, a website could be
liable for taking part in an illegal act. This is a reasonable limit that is in
line with the First Amendment's limit on liability for intermediaries.
Courts have generally held that a website is not immune if it actively
participates in the allegedly harmful conduct. This presents a tricky
question: what constitutes active participation? For example, in
Goddard v. Google, Inc.,133 a putative class of consumer plaintiffs sued
Google over allegedly fraudulent advertisements for mobile device
services that ran on Google's "AdWords" network.134 The Court
dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiff did not sufficiently
allege that Google participated in the advertisement's creation.
However, the Court gave the plaintiff 30 days to amend and refile the

666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).
127. Id. at 672 ("If [C]raigslist 'causes' the discriminatory notices, then so do phone
companies and courier services (and, for that matter, the firms that make the computers and
software that owners use to post their notices online), yet no one could think that Microsoft and
Dell are liable for 'causing' discriminatory advertisements.").
128. 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008).
129. Id. at 415.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 416.
132. Id.
133. Goddard v. Google, Inc., No. C 08-2738JF(PVT), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101890
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008).
134. Id. at *l-*2.
135.

Id. at *26
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complaint.136 "If Plaintiff could establish Google's involvement in
'creating or developing' the AdWords, either 'in whole or in part,' she
might avoid the statutory immunity created by § 230."137 This is a fairly
straightforward application of the Ninth Circuit's Roommates.com
decision: Google is not liable if it passively transmits a fraudulent
advertisement. But Google is liable to the extent that it helped a
company create an advertisement and commit fraud.
A number of recent court decisions have applied Roommates.com
and found that the website defendant's participation in the harmful acts
amounted to a waiver of Section 230 immunity. In Alvi Armani
Medical, Inc. v. Hennessey,'3 8 the plaintiff company sued a competitor
under a state unlawful trade practices statute, claiming that the
competitor's website contained false and misleading information about
the plaintiff. The Court refused to grant a motion to dismiss based on
Section 230.139
The purpose of the CDA is to establish federal immunity to any
cause of action that would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third-party user of the service.
Although the majority of federal circuits have held that such
immunity is broad, the statutory immunity provided for under the
CDA does not apply without limitation.14
In Capital Corp. Merchant Banking, Inc. v. Corporate Colocation,
Inc.,14 1 the Court refused to dismiss a defamation claim against a
website that allegedly created the content, finding that Section 230
"provides immunity for the removal of content, not the creation of the
content." 42
In Woodhull v. Meinel,143 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
reversed a grant of Section 230 immunity to a website that solicited
allegedly defamatory e-mail messages about the plaintiff and posted the
e-mail messages online. The Court distinguished this from cases in
which websites have received section 230 immunity. 144 In this case, the
Court wrote, "[i]nstead of merely editing an email from a third party,
Defendant apparently requested potentially defamatory material for her
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
2008).

Id. at *27.
Id.
629 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1306 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
No. 6:07-cv-1626-Orl-19KRS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68154 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26,

142. Id. at *10-l1l.

143. 202 P.3d 126, 128 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
144. Id. at 133.
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own stated purpose of 'making fun of Plaintiff." 45 The Tenth Circuit
recently held that a website could not use Section 230 as a shield against
regulators' claims that it violated federal privacy laws.14 6 In FTC v.
Accusearch, Inc., the Federal Trade Commission alleged that a website
that sold personal information such as unlisted telephone numbers
collected that data illegally.14 7 The website argued that it merely
received requests for information from customers and contracted the
investigations to third-party researchers, so therefore the website was an
intermediary protected by Section 230. 148 The Tenth Circuit rejected
this defense, however, finding that by soliciting information requests
from consumers and paying contracted researchers, the website "was
responsible for the development of that content--for the conversion of
the legally protected records from confidential material to publicly
exposed information." 49
These cases demonstrate that Section 230 immunity is not as broad
as some critics might suggest. Section 230 reasonably limits liability to
harm caused by content that the website played an active role in
creating. Granted, as with many legal rules, it is not always clear when
this exception to Section 230 immunity applies. In close cases, both
sides would be able to make compelling arguments that Section 230
does not apply. But after reviewing the cases, it becomes clear that for
an online intermediary to lose its Section 230 immunity, it must play
more than a passive role in the alleged injury. At a minimum, for a
website to lose immunity it must take specific steps that specifically
encourage the plaintiff s injury, as in Roommates.com, but many courts
are likely to require varying levels of "encouragement" to abrogate
Section 230 immunity.150

145. Id.
146. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009).
147. Id. at 1190.
148. Id. at 1196.
149. Id. at 1199.
150. See Eric Goldman, Website Initially Denied 230 Dismissal But Gets It on Appeal,
availableat http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/12/websiteinitial.htm (Dec. 21, 2009).
I believe there are some folks who believe that a website becomes liable for any
user content it "encourages." This is one possible reading of Roommates.com,
and it underlies the government enforcement agencies' (e.g., SEC and FTC)
content endorsement theories. However, I don't see precedent supporting that
proposition at all.
Id.
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B. Many Section 230 Cases Involve Speech that Would Have Been
ProtectedUnder Other Laws
Courts have applied Section 230 in a manner consistent with the
First Amendment's imposition of liability on the content creator rather
than republisher. Section 230 plays the important role of articulating a
policy preference of Congress: to encourage, but not mandate, websites
to impose their own content controls on third-party material.
To get a sense of how Section 230 is currently applied, a survey was
taken of every published opinion that dismissed a lawsuit under Section
230 in 2008 and 2009. Of the 28 opinions that granted Section 230
immunity, five were defamation lawsuits involving plaintiffs who
arguably were public officials or public figures. 5 ' Had Section 230 not
been passed, courts very likely would have dismissed these cases for
lack of actual malice. It would be difficult for a court to demonstrate
that allowing anonymous comments from third parties constitutes
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of falsity. And five of the
lawsuits that were dismissed on Section 230 grounds were also
dismissed for other reasons involving failure to state a claim.152
Additionally, in one opinion, the website had taken prompt action to
remove the defamatory content upon receiving a complaint, even before
a lawsuit was filed.153
151. See, e.g., Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877 (E.D. Wis. 2009)
(dismissing invasion-of-privacy lawsuit filed by noted animal rights activist against search
engines); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 546-47
(E.D. Va. 2008) (dismissing lawsuit against consumer review website filed by automotive
dealerships); Best Western Int'l, Inc. v. Furber, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70552, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008) (dismissing lawsuit filed by association of hotel
operators against website); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d
929, 930 (D. Ariz. 2008) (dismissing lawsuit under Section 230 filed by large consumer retailer
against consumer review website); Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No.
2:04-cv-47-FtM-34SPC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11632, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2008)
(dismissing defamation lawsuit filed by large company against consumer review website).
152. See, e.g., Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53246, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (dismissing a claim under both Section 230 and Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim); McDermott v. N.Y. Metro LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d
294, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing claim for lack of standing); Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. C
07-03967 MHP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16561, at *29, *41-43 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2008)
(dismissing lawsuit against website under Section 230 as well as failure to state a claim for
fraud); Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found., Inc., No. CV 08-0054-PHX-SMM, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109347, at *12-15 (D. Ariz. July 8, 2008) (dismissing lawsuit against website host both
under Section 230 and because plaintiff failed to state a valid RICO claim); Steele v.
Mengelkoch, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 927, at *2-6 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing
claim against website under Section 230 and failure to state a claim of conspiracy).
153. See, e.g., Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., No. 07-cv-286-JL, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38177, at *4-5 (D.N.H. May 8, 2008) (dismissing lawsuit against dating website that
removed profile of plaintiff that was created by a third party).
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C. Plaintiffs Still May Sue Anonymous Commenters
Critics of Section 230 argue that if websites are immune from
lawsuits over third-party content, plaintiffs may find themselves victims
of a tort but unable to recover.15 4 This often is not true, because Section
230 does not prevent plaintiffs from suing the people who posted the
allegedly tortious comments.' 5 5
Many of the most objectionable online comments are made
anonymously, presenting a challenge to plaintiffs seeking to sue the
commenters. But it has become increasingly common for plaintiffs to
sue John Doe defendants and subpoena the websites for their identifying
information as part of the preliminary discovery.156 Even if anonymous
commenters do not have to register with the websites, many sites log
users' Internet Protocol addresses, which are unique sets of numbers
associated with each Internet connection. 157 Once a plaintiff has the
Internet Protocol address, the plaintiff can send a second subpoena for
the Internet subscriber's identity to the Internet service provider who
maintains that address.' 5 8 Although this is an imperfect method, it
demonstrates that it is possible to identify someone who posts
anonymously, even if additional depositions and discovery are
necessary.
This method of discovery has sparked a great deal of debate among
academics and judges about the level of First Amendment protection to
provide to anonymous online speech.159 The general elements of a
commonly used balancing test are: "1) a concrete showing of a prima
facie claim of actionable harm; (2) the specificity of the discovery
request; (3) the absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed
information; (4) a central need for the subpoenaed information to
advance the claim; and (5) the Doe defendants' expectation of
privacy."160 Under such a test, a plaintiff must at least allege a concrete

harm caused by the anonymous speech.161 However, this First
154. See PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 66.

155. See id.
156. For a list of the many recent attempts to unmask anonymous Internet commenters, see
Citizens Media Law Project's website regarding anonymous website poster subpoenas,
available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/subject-area/subpoenas.
157. Jonathan D. Jones, Note, Cybersmears and John Doe: How Far Should First
Amendment Protection of Anonymous Internet Speakers Extend?, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 421,
424-25 (2009)
158. Id.
159. Id. at 422-23 (articulating the various First Amendment balancing tests used to
determine whether to allow a subpoena for the identity of an online poster).
160. Best Western Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at
*5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006).
161. Id.
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Amendment balancing test does not present an insurmountable obstacle
to a plaintiff with a valid claim. For example, in Doe v. Individuals,162
two female law students sued dozens of John Doe defendants who
posted allegedly defamatory comments about them on AutoAdmit, a
law school discussion website. Although the website was immune from
liability under Section 230, the plaintiffs subpoenaed the admissions
website and many other websites and ISPs for information that would
help them identify the posters.16 3 One of the anonymous defendants
moved to quash the subpoena, but the Court denied the motion, finding
that "the plaintiff has shown sufficient evidence supporting a prima
facie case for libel, and thus the balancing test of the plaintiffs interest
in pursuing discovery in this case outweighs the defendant's First
Amendment right to speak anonymously."l 64 This demonstrates that it is
often possible for a plaintiff to use subpoenas to identify the person who
caused the harm. The practice is becoming increasingly common.
Ripoff Report even published instructions for plaintiffs to obtain
subpoenas to identify the posters. 165
In addition to ensuring that plaintiffs are compensated by the
individual who actually caused the harm, subpoenas can serve an
important deterrent effect: if individuals see that courts are willing to
unmask them and hold them accountable for their anonymous postings,
they likely will be more careful when posting material online. Holding
the intermediary websites responsible also would provide a deterrent
effect, but it likely would result in a sweeping and overbroad regulation
of speech. In 2007, the average post-trial award in a defamation lawsuit
was $556,000.166 This is a significant amount of money, and it is larger
than the annual budget of many small community websites. If a website
were held responsible for every anonymous comment posted on the site,
it would only have three options to ensure that it avoids liability: 1) hire
editors to screen every comment before it is posted, 2) take down every
comment upon receiving complaints, and 3) prohibit third parties from
posting online. Because many websites receive thousands of comments
an hour, it is impractical to screen every comment. Additionally, even if
editors screened every comment, it would be difficult for them to verify
the accuracy without a long delay, destroying the real-time
characteristics of the Internet. Although a notice-and-takedown system
162. 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (D. Conn. 2008).
163. Id. at 252.
164. Id. at 257.
165. About Us: False Report About me on this Site!, http://www.ripoffreport.com/
ConsumersSayThankYou/FalseReport.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
166. Press Release, Media Law Resource Center, Annual Study Sees Lowest Number of
Media Verdicts Since 1980, available at http://www.medialaw.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
About MLRC/News/2008_BulletinNo_1_.htm.
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is more practical, that still could result in an unfair burden on speech.
Such a system likely would result in automatic deletion, because
websites generally do not have the ability or resources to investigate
every claim of inaccuracy or other harm in third-party content.
Although the Digital Millennium Copyright Act imposes a notice-andtakedown system for alleged copyright violations, it is easier to
determine that a video or picture infringes copyright than determine
whether an online bulletin board post is accurate.1 67 Therefore, the
likely result in holding intermediaries responsible would be prohibition
of third-party content. All content would be created and provided by the
websites, an online version of the print newspaper. Such a change
would destroy the open community environment for which the Internet
is known. Although it would prevent the small amount of harmful thirdparty speech that has spurred the criticism of Section 230, this change
would stifle a much larger amount of socially valuable speech.
Although it is easier-and possibly more lucrative-to sue the
website on which defamatory content appeared rather than an
anonymous individual, it is fairer to seek compensation from the
individual who actually created the allegedly harmful content. In his
famous law review article examining fairness and reciprocity in tort
liability, Professor George P. Fletcher captured the two often competing
goals of tort law: 1) protecting individuals' interests, and 2) maximizing
society's benefits:"Protecting innocent victims from socially useful
risks is one issue. The relative rationality of defining risks and
balancing consequences is quite another. That there are these two levels
of tension helps explain the ongoing vitality of both paradigms of tort
liability. 6 s
Imposing liability on intermediaries, rather than on the parties who
created the content, does not adequately accomplish either of those
goals. Intermediary liability fails to adequately protect individual
interests because it allows the actual tortfeasor-the creator of the
defamatory content-to escape responsibility. Intermediary liability
harms society because intermediaries' risk aversion reduces the amount
of legal speech. By imposing liability on the intermediary, a court is
harming society at large by reducing the amount of speech on the
Internet. A tort system that imposes the costs on the person who
engaged in the legal risk-the anonymous commenter-is the fairest
method of imposing liability.

167. Benedict, supra note 11.
168. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537, 572
(1972).
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D. Websites have Developed Content-ScreeningPolicies Consistent
with Congress'sIntent
Section 230 is based on the assumption that allowing a free
marketplace of speech is the most efficient way to address concerns
about content. By protecting websites from most civil lawsuits rather
than forcing websites to censor certain content, Congress assumed that
the market would demand a certain level of decency and civility online.
That is precisely what has happened; websites and ISPs have developed
a wide range of content standards and moderation policies in response
to consumer demand.
Such a "marketplace" concept is rooted in free-speech principles. In
1644, John Milton wrote:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon
the earth so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing
and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors in a free and open
encounter? 169
In the United States, the First Amendment partly developed with a
similar marketplace foundation. Justice Holmes wrote "that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market."17 0
Critics of Congress's approach in Section 230 could argue that an
intermediary's content standards are no better than government
censorship. Therefore, a truly free marketplace of speech has not
emerged. Although this concern is valid, there is a key difference:
websites develop content policies in response to customer demand. For
example, a newspaper website is unlikely to allow users to post obscene
comments or pornographic pictures beneath a news article; such
behavior would drive away many customers. Conversely, a newspaper
realizes that some readers value the ability to debate issues on its
website, so the newspaper might hesitate before banning third-party
comments altogether. Because they seek to please their customers,
intermediaries are more likely than courts to develop content standards
that conform to basic community values. Such standards may vary by
website, allowing consumers to choose. In contrast, if courts or
legislatures impose content standards, they likely will apply to all
websites equally. This market-based system, of course, is not perfect.
169.

JOHN MILTON, MILTON AREOPAGITICA, 51-52 (John W. Hales, ed. Clarendon Press 3d.

ed. 1884) (1644).
170. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Content standards developed by websites might please a majority of
customers while harming a minority. But such a risk is present if the
standards come from a court or legislature.
Congress intended to encourage online intermediaries to develop
their own content policies, rather than have their standards set by courts.
A review of online terms of service for popular websites shows they
reserve the right to delete objectionable content.
It would be difficult to determine how often websites actually edit
and remove third-party content, because such decisions often are made
by internal legal departments and are not subject to public knowledge.
But the terms of use provides a glimpse of content control that websites
reserve and the standards set. I examined the terms of use for ten
websites: the five largest news sites: CNN.com,"' Yahoo! News,172
Digg,1 73 NYTimes.com,174 and USATODAY.com;' 7 5 and the five
largest social networking sites: Facebook,176 Myspace,1 77 Twitter, 7 8
Linkedin,179 and Classmates. so Although the specificity and scope of
the policies vary, two common elements are present in all of the terms
of use policies: content guidelines and the reserved right of the website
to edit content to conform to those guidelines.
The terms of use all generally prohibit offensive content, although
they vary in detail.1 8 ' CNN's policy is the least specific, though perhaps
broadest, by prohibiting content which violates or infringes in any way
upon the rights of others, which is unlawful, threatening, abusive,
defamatory, invasive of privacy or publicity rights, vulgar, obscene,
profane or otherwise objectionable, which encourages conduct that
would constitute a criminal offense, give rise to civil liability or

171. CNN Service Agreement, http://www.cnn.com/interactive-legal.html(last visited Jan.
3, 2010).
172. Yahoo! Terms of Use, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/apilapi-2140.html (last
visited Jan. 3, 2010).
173. Digg Terms of Use, http://digg.com/tou (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
174. NYTimes.com Terms of Service, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/
agree.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
175. USATODAY.com Terms of Service, http://www.usatoday.com/marketing/tos.htm
(last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
176. Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, http://www.facebook.com/terms.
php?ref-pf (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
177. MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, http://www.myspace.com/help/terms (last
visited Oct. 27, 2010).
178. Twitter Terms of Service, http://twitter.com/tos (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
179. Linkedln User Agreement, http://www.linkedin.com/static?key-user-agreement&
trk-hb ft userag (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
180. Terms of Service Classmates Online, Inc., http://www.classmates.com/cmo/reg/
terms.jsp (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
181. See supra notes 171-80.
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otherwise violate any law.' 8 2 Many of the other websites have much
more detailed content guidelines. For example, Myspace has a sixteenpart content policy that prohibits, among other things, "nudity,
excessive violence, or offensive subject matter," material that "solicits
or is designed to solicit personal information from anyone under 18 "
and any content that "exploits people in a sexual or violent manner."9Ik
Because MySpace caters to younger consumers than a news site such as
CNN, it makes sense that MySpace has more explicit and restrictive
content guidelines. This is a restriction that developed because of
marketplace demands. Similarly, NYTimes.com's user policy
recognizes the heated political arguments that some articles may prompt
among commenters:
In a community full of opinions and preferences, people always
disagree. NYTimes.com encourages active discussions and
welcomes heated debate on the Service. But personal attacks are
a direct violation of these Terms of Service and are grounds for
immediate and permanent suspension of access to all or part of

the Service.184
Just as all of the user policies set content guidelines, they also
reserve the right to delete or edit third-party content that violates these
guidelines. Generally, the websites give themselves latitude to edit
third-party content without obligating themselves to edit. This is the
type of content policy that Congress designed when it drafted Section
230; specifically writing a provision that allowed websites to edit some
third-party content without becoming responsible for all third-party
content on the site, as the Stratton-Oakmontcase indicated.
Websites must be careful to not over-promise in their content
policies. For example, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,'8 5 the Ninth Circuit
found that the plaintiff might have a valid promissory estoppel claim
against Yahoo!, which failed to remove defamatory content about the
plaintiff after promising to do so.1 86 The Court found that Section 230
does not extend to a website's broken promise, because promising is not
part of the "publishing" that Section 230 covers. 8 7 Under Barnes, a
website is not liable for a third party's defamatory content, and it is not
liable if it edits that content, but if the website promises to remove the
182. See supra note 171.
183. See supra note 177.
184. See supra note 174.
185. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
186. Id. at 1109.
187. Id. at 1107 ("Promising is different because it is not synonymous with the
performance of the action promised.").
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content and fails to do so, it could be liable under promissory estoppel
or contract theories.' 8 8 It is unclear how far this recent rule will extend,
as no other courts have yet to apply it. Shortly after Barnes, a California
state trial court in Scott P. v. Craigslist'8 declined to dismiss a
promissory estoppel claim against Craigslist, which allegedly promised
to prevent damaging third-party postings. At a hearing in which the
court found that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded promissory estoppel,
the judge state that "Barnes did decide that the conduct of agreeing to
do something is not conduct of a publisher with the meaning of 230, and
was separate and apart and could survive."l 90 Barnes and Scott P.
involve promises explicitly made to individuals. It might be more
difficult for a plaintiff to recover on a promissory estoppel claim based
on a general statement made in a Terms of Use policy.
In theory, Section 230 allows websites to choose to impose no
content controls on third-party content, with the exception of material
that infringes another party's intellectual property rights. But in reality,
websites that want to thrive in the marketplace must impose some
standards of conduct that make the website attractive to the average
consumer. Websites have imposed these standards in numerous ways.
For example, Craigslist allows its readers to click an icon that "flags"
and if enough people flag a post, it is
objectionable third-part Tostings,
The Making Light blog removes the vowels
automatically removed.
of objectionable third-party posts, a process that became known as
"disemvoweling."l 92 Consumerist prohibits anonymous commenters; all
comments must be posted under an individual's real name and e-mail
address.193 The website of the Pantagraph newspaper in Indiana
stopped allowing third-party comments altogether, finding that "they are
offensive and devoid of civility, the worst of which include personal
attacks and/or assertions that have nothing to do with the story." 194
18 8. Id.
189. Scott P. v. Craigslist, No. CGC-10-496687 at *20 (Cal. Sup. Ct., County of San
Francisco), transcript of June 2, 2010 hearing available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/cit
medialaw.org/files/2010-06-02-Scott%2OvP.%20v.%2OCraigslist%20Hearing.pdf (last visited
on Sept. 28, 2010).
190. Id.
191. Craigslist-Flags and Community Moderation, http://www.craigslist.org/about/help
flagsandcommunitymoderation (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
192. Making Light, Autodisemvoweling, Sept. 27, 2005, http://nielsenhayden.com/making
light/archives/006871 .html (last visited on Jan. 3, 2010).
193. The Consumerists, Anonymous Comments and Facebook Connect Deactivated, July
28, 2009, http://consumerist.com/2009/07/anonymous-comments-and-facebook-connect-deactiv
ated.html (last visited on Jan. 3, 2010).
194. Pentagraph, To our readers: Comments on Local Content Suspended, http://www.
pantagraph.com/news/locallarticle_766adc82-f58a-llde-b4cc-001cc4cO3286.html (last visited
on Jan. 3, 2010).
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While there always will be corners of the Internet with no such controls,
the most frequently visited websites always will impose standards of
third-party conduct that Congress envisioned when it passed Section
230. It is noteworthy that even AutoAdmit, the law school admissions
board that became a poster child for irresponsible websites that hide
behind Section 230, has begun moderating anonymous comments. 19 5
AutoAdmit has deleted many of the objectionable threads that caused
the plaintiffs to sue.' 96 A Google search for the objectionable comments
that sparked the lawsuit finds that most of them have vanished from the
Internet. Thus, even AutoAdmit, which was a rallying cry for Section
230 opponents,' 9 7 has determined a minimum level of decency that
requires the deletion of objectionable content. This demonstrates that
even the websites that are far from mainstream will conform, to a
certain extent, to community standards. This occurs even though
Section 230 immunizes the sites from most lawsuits. A website will not
survive in the marketplace if it completely ignores basic standards of
decency and fairness.
V. CONCLUSION
This article aimed to demonstrate that Section 230 is Congress's
choice of implementing longstanding First Amendment values. Had
Congress not passed Section 230, courts likely would have gradually
developed some level of immunity for online intermediaries, although
that immunity might not have been identical to Section 230. Although
Section 230 has attracted valid criticism, it is Congress's chosen method
of preserving free speech on an emerging platform. The growth of
social networking and other websites that rely on third-party content
shows that Congress accomplished its goals. Section 230 has not
spawned a no-man's land that lacks any content controls; as I
demonstrated in the previous section, even some of the most permissive
websites have developed some content standards in response to
consumer demand. It is more consistent with First Amendment values,
however, to allow the intermediaries to develop these standards in
response to consumer demand than to require the websites to fashion
content standards in a way that they can only hope will satisfy the
courts. Although Section 230 is far from perfect, it has allowed
195. David Margolick, Slimed Online, PORTFOLIO.coM, Feb. 11, 2009 available at
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2009/02/1 1/Two-Lawyers-Figh
t-Cyber-Bullying/index.html ("Things have calmed down on AutoAdmit, where, Cohen says,
he's driven away the worst actors and enlisted volunteer moderators.").
196. Id. ("[L]ast spring, Cohen quietly removed the offending threads.").
197. Id.
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intermediaries to experiment with various policies and practices that
allow free speech to thrive on the Internet.

